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Second Level Coping Mechanism:
A Study on Problem Solving Measures Taken 







This article concerns the efforts carried out by lower level bureaucrats in order to implement 
their decisions. Prior studies generally describe the decision of street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) as 
decisions that have already been implemented.  There have not been many studies describing 
the efforts of SLBs in realizing their decisions. Thus, this study intends to examine the efforts 
undertaken by the lowest level bureaucrats to implement the decisions they have made. The main 
reference used to analyze this phenomenon is by using the structural approach and the DNA of 
negotiation. To describe this phenomenon, the study explored a case of program implementation 
on land redistribution in the Cipari District, Cilacap Regency in 2010. Study results show that 
power, strategy, and distributive negotiation tactic, as well as personal values are key elements in 
implementing decisions. The results indicate that discretion is not always applicable since there 
are times when discretion is limited and thus it must be developed. Because this study relates to 
the success or failure of policy implementation, knowledge about ways of developing discretion 
becomes a substantial part in optimally developing public policy.
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Introduction
This study is a study on problem 
solving mechanism conducted by street-level 
bureaucrats (SLBs) in a situation involving 
horizontal implementation. Problem solving 
mechanism refers to actions or decisions taken 
by SLBs when facing opposing situation in 
policy implementation. Michael Lipsky (2010) 
refers to this as coping mechanism. So far, 
there has not been many studies on coping 
mechanism describing the study in a horizontal 
situation. The existing studies mostly describe 
problem solving mechanism in a hierarchical 
implementation situation – wherein the clients 
depend on SLBs, such as: Vincent Dubois (2010 
in Tummers et al. 2015) who conducted a study 
on the use of personal resources; Tummers et 
al. (2012) who conducted a study on ‘bending 
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rules’; Dorothea Anagnostopoulos (2003) on 
‘breaking rules’; Henrik Wagenaar (2004) on 
instrumental measures; or Siddharta Baviskar 
(2018)Copyright © 2018 Taylor  &  Francis 
Group, LLC. ABSTRACT: Ideas as to how 
and why individuals resort to creaming are 
generated primarily by a few qualitative 
studies and have, to our knowledge, not been 
tested quantitatively. This article aims to fill 
this gap and explains the classroom cream-
skimming behavior of school teachers in 
Denmark, defined as prioritizing the teaching 
of academically promising students. Drawing 
on the street-level bureaucracy literature, it 
tests the following propositions: (1 and Katrin 
Križ & Marit Skivenes (2012) who conducted 
studies on the priority of clients.
In a horizontal situation, the decision 
made by SLBs may differ. Policy horizontal 
situations, which are indicated by the presence 
of non-state actors in the policy process, make 
decisions difficult to implement (Budiman 
and Hadiz in Pratikno, 2007) – the coping 
mechanism that has been decided may not 
entirely be implemented. The approval of 
other actors in the policy process over a form 
of problem solving mechanism entails the 
following resolution measures that must be 
carried out by SLBs. The presence of non-state 
actors pushes SLBs to carry out subsequent 
problem solving mechanism in order to be able 
to implement the problem solving mechanism 
which had been decided earlier.
Essentially, this study is a study on 
negotiations between SLBs and non-state actors. 
Studies on low-level bureaucrat negotiations 
have been conducted numerously. One of them 
is a study conducted by Clarissa Marcondes 
Macea. In Macea’s study, it is stated that 
negotiation practices in policy implementation 
may result in the program running effectively 
and thus the government benefits from them 
(Macéa, 2014). In line with Macea, Collin Eden 
and Fran Ackerman also suggest negotiations 
in the policy process. They even went so far as 
to suggest that the negotiation process should 
be conducted as a conscious process (Eden & 
Ackermann, 2014)and public-public, projects 
are now an established way of creating public 
value. Establishing joint goals within a context of 
different ‘own goals’ is important and difficult. 
A particular issue facing many organisations in 
seeking to negotiate joint goals in a collaborative 
project is that of getting all the key managers 
from both organisations together over enough 
of a sequence of meetings for agreements 
to be meaningful and owned by those who 
will deliver the project. The development 
of such goals can be significantly enhanced 
by (1. Subsequently, a study on low-level 
bureaucrat  negotiation that is more technical-
practical was conducted by Vicky Johansson. 
Johansson (2012) found that fragmented 
implementation structure determines when 
and how negotiations are conducted by 
SLBs. Meanwhile, this study examined SLB 
negotiations within horizontal implementation 
situation. In this case, the SLBs were not the 
only actors involved in the implementation 
process. Given the situation, the SLBs’ decisions 
were not necessarily implementable (Pratikno, 
2007). So, as mentioned by Zartman (1997), 
under horizontal conditions, negotiations 
are done not because of the fragmentation of 
implementation structure, but because there 
are other parties with sufficient power forcing 
their will.
Theoretically speaking, this is a significant 
study as it contributes new knowledge to 
studies on SLBs, which have thus far been 
positioned in a hierarchical situation. The 
theoretical contribution of this study lies 
in the extension of knowledgeable insight 
concerning negotiation measures carried out 
by SLBs. In essence, this study is a response 
to Vicky Johansson’s study which analyzed 
negotiation measures of low-level bureaucrats 
in the infrastructure policy sector. This study 
concurs with Johansson that SLBs negotiate 
not because they choose to negotiate but 
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because negotiation is considered as the best 
means available. Empirically speaking, this is a 
substantial study because it explored the case of 
land redistribution in Cipari, Cilacap, involving 
SLBs of Agrarian Reform (Reforma Agraria 
- RA) and client organizations. Knowledge 
about program implementation will be highly 
beneficial in implementing similar future 
programs. Concerning this program, the 
government states that there are still 9 (nine) 
million hectares of state land categorized as 
Land Objects of Agrarian Reform (Tanah Obyek 
Reforma Agraria – TORA), which are ready to 
be redistributed (Kantor Staf Presiden, 2016).
Based on the background above, the 
question posed is: how are the negotiations 
carried out by SLBs of RA in order to implement 
their decisions? Due to the fact that relations 
among state and non-state actors are closely 
associated with power (Baker, 2002), a structural 
negotiation approach is used to examine the 
negotiation process undertaken by SLBs of RA. 
This approach is a negotiation approach that 
observes the power of the parties involved as 
a key element in the negotiation process.
SLBs of Agrarian Reform and Horizontal 
Situation
In addition to being policy implementers, 
SLBs are also known as policy makers or decision 
makers and negotiators (Johansson, 2012). As 
previously mentioned, SLBs are the lowest 
level bureaucrats in the bureaucratic chain 
that are tasked in implementing (delivering) 
policies (Lipsky, 2010, p. 3). In conducting 
their daily tasks they are not inseparable from 
various problems, such as policies that are not 
necessarily compatible with  varying clients 
and temptations originating from within their 
own selves (Gofen, 2014; Hupe & Hill, 2007; 
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Sager 
et al., 2014). SLBs have developed particular 
mechanisms to address such contradictory 
situation and resolve them (Lipsky, 2010, p. 
13). Two things allowing SLBs to employ these 
mechanisms are the extensive discretion and 
autonomy that they hold (Lipsky, 2010, p. 14).
An SLB-like role in implementing 
RA policy that was attached to the lowest 
government institution or the committee 
formed by this lowest level of administrative 
unit5 had similarities and differences with 
the already well known SLBs. In terms of 
control, SLBs of RA had extensive autonomy. 
Observed from the level of administrative 
structure, the village government along with 
its personnel or redistribution executive 
committee were far removed from the regent 
(regional government) as the ruler of the 
regency; were far removed from the governor 
(provincial government); and even farther 
removed from the minister of home affairs; 
and exceedingly far removed from the National 
Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional – BPN) 
as the bearer of the land reform policy. In this 
case, SLBs of RA refers to an organization 
instead of an individual. In terms of face-to-
face meeting with clients, due to the village 
head and staff’s small coverage of work area, 
they were able to have more intensive direct 
engagements with their clients. The following 
table shows a comparison of several attributes 
from SLBs that have already been studied. 
One thing that is quite interesting from 
SLBs of RA was the client type or target group. 
The client type faced by SLBs of RA policy was a 
combination of passive and active clients. Both 
active and passive clients became one of SLBs’ 
focuses of attention in decision making. Passive 
client in this study is defined as introduced 
by Lipsky, such as: students, criminals, the 
unemployed, or the sick are clients that the SLBs 
5 In the Presidential Decree No. 55/1980 on the Organization 
and Procedure for the Implementation of Land Reform, 
the executors of the land reform policy are the personnel 
in the ministry of home affairs, starting from the Minister 
of Home Affairs and staff at the national level until the 
village head and staff at the village level. The lowest 
level of bureaucratic rank and file in the land reform 
governance is the village head and staff. They are to be 
assisted by a local land office staff in establishing a land 
reform committee.
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considered within the limit of their individual 
preference. Whereas, active client is defined 
as clients who aside from being considered by 
SLBs based on their individual preference are 
also considered by SLBs as those possessing 
greater power6, which is the power to reject the 
various decisions made by SLBs. In the policy 
process, even more so today, disagreements 
6 Horizontal situation is a policy process situation 
indicated by the presence of other actors aside from the 
state. The involvement of non-state actors in the policy 
process is because they have greater power than they 
used to (Pratikno, 2007, 2008). They are more active than 
the previous time periods. Within such situation, policy 
cannot be easily implemented (Budiman and Hadiz in 
Pratikno, 2007). In this situation decisions have to be 
negotiated (Pratikno, 2007). The horizontal condition 
of RA policy in Cipari, Cilacap has been established 
since a long time ago. If the involvement of non-state 
actor in the public policy process is in the form of mass 
mobilization, threats, and intimidations (Susskind, 
2006), then horizontalism in land/agrarian policy or in 
policies relating to the social economic life of farmers 
in Indonesia has fundamentally taken place for quite 
a long time – since the colonial period (see Bachriadi, 
2012). Citing Jonathan Fox, Skocpol, Landsberger, 
and James Scott, Bachriadi provides a description that 
forms of involvement by non-state actors in agrarian 
policy range from ‘daily resistance’, which is individual 
and subtle, to more flagrant forms such as collective 
protests, or even  more extreme measures in the form 
of revolts or uprisings (Bachriadi, 2012). Concerning the 
horizontalism condition of RA in Cipari, Cilacap, Desi 
Rahmawati (2003) has provided a clear illustration on 
the formation of client organization there. Meanwhile, 
concerning public (client) involvement, Jarot Santoso 
(2016) has described what means have been employed 
by the Cipari, Cilacap farmers’ movement to develop, 
continue their struggle, and ultimately influence the 
policy process.
are commonplace and negotiations as an effort 
to resolve issues of dissent is not uncommon 
as well (Fuller, 2013). For that reason, the 
coping mechanism produced by SLBs is not 
only limited to the conventional mechanism 
(moving toward, moving away from, and 
moving against), but it also entails a coping 
mechanism in the form of negotiation.
Under such conditions, the practice of 
decision making or the production of coping 
mechanism differs. In this situation, the 
problems encountered by SLBs are not only 
incomplete policy regulations, diverse client 
interests, organizational codes, and personal 
values, but also clients who have the power to 
reject decisions. After producing a particular 
coping mechanism, SLBs must also carry 
out another coping mechanism, which is 
negotiation with their clients – as if there were 
two levels of coping mechanisms (ilustrated 
in Figure 1).
The figure above shows that negotiations 
carried out by SLBs are not brought about 
by the fragmentation of implementation 
structure, but by the horizontal situation of the 
implementation process. Within the process, on 
the one hand, there are non-state actors who 
have the capacity to dismiss the decisions of 
state actors, while on the other, there are state 
actors who recognize that non-state actors have 













Relation Direct Indirect Indirect Direct
Focus of Service Individual Collective Collective Individual
Participant Client Organization Government, 
Organization
Government Client Organization
Target Group Closed Open Closed Open
Profession of SLBs Professional Bureaucrat Bureaucrat Bureaucrat
Institutional Level Individual Organization Organization Ad Hoc Organization
Type of Client Passive Passive Passive Passive and Active
Source: Mikael Seva (2015) and Vicky Johansson (2012)
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Negotiation of Street-Level Bureaucrats 
In addition to being policy makers and 
implementers, SLBs may also function as 
negotiators (Johansson, 2012). According to 
Ray Fells (2009, p. 4) negotiation is generally 
defined as a process in which two parties 
with different interests meet, or to be precise, 
negotiation is a process where two parties with 
differences that they intend to resolve try to 
reach an agreement by means of exchanging 
offers or exploring alternatives. As a process, if 
negotiation were made into a structure, it would 
consist of antecedents that include preparation, 
atmosphere, and background of the negotiator; 
of negotiation process that include processes of 
creativity, persuasion, emphasizing position, 
overcoming deadlocks, break-up behavior, 
and threats; and outcome or agreement 
(Ott, Prowse, Fells, & Rogers, 2016). Then, 
negotiation factors or elements, such as power 
(Fells, 2009, p. 14; Fisher, 1983; R. Lewicki, 
Saunders, & Barry, 2007; Overbeck & Kim, 
2013) will start to function when the negotiation 
process takes place (Ott et al., 2016). In addition, 
strategy also holds a substantial role to achieve 
a satisfying negotiation outcome because it 
is implemented by the negotiator when the 
negotiation encounters a problem (Alfredson 
& Cungu, 2008; R. J. Lewicki, Saunder, Barry, 
& Saunders, 2007). Subsequently, once the 
situation has been addressed an agreement 
(negotiation outcome) is achieved.
Preparing oneself for a negotiation 
process is of utmost importance (Ury, 2007, 
pp. 33–46). In this stage, the negotiator is 
encouraged to understand his/her position and 
interests. A position in a negotiation process 
refers to something that the negotiator desires, 
whereas interest refers to the desire or need 
that motivates the negotiator (Fuller, 2013). Ury 
(2007) describes interest as things that revolve 
around position. For instance, in the Cipari land 
redistribution case, it was the SLBs’ decision 
that the people who will receive land that PT. 
RSA formerly had the Right of Exploitation 
(HGU) to would be the poor community in the 
five villages, this is the position of SLBs, while 
SLBs’ interest is to lift villagers out of poverty. 
In negotiations, knowledge about position 
and interests is essential as it determines the 
subsequent negotiation process. Positions 
usually do not change easily (Ury, 2007, p. 1).
Figure 1.
Dual Level Coping Mechanism
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Power in the negotiation process is 
generally acknowledged as a substantial element 
in the negotiation process. If negotiation is 
defined as ‘influence’, aside from status, power 
is the main source of such ‘influence’ (Overbeck 
& Kim, 2013). Indeed, power is not the only 
substantial element in negotiations (Fells, 2009). 
However, in this study, since relations between 
state and non-state actors in the policy process 
were strongly associated with the relative 
power the parties held (Baker, 2002), then the 
power approach was used to help analyze the 
negotiation situation under study. The power 
approach for negotiation, which is also known 
as the structuralist approach of negotiation, is a 
negotiation approach that considers the relative 
power among the parties involved in the 
negotiation process as a significant element that 
may drive the negotiation process (Alfredson 
& Cungu, 2008).
In general, power is defined as a person’s 
ability to make others do something he/she 
wants (Fisher, 1983; R. J. Lewicki et al., 2007). 
One of the earliest definition of power is, 
essentially, the ability to get what you want 
(Russell, 1938). The most basic form of power 
is physical power: using threat or inflicting 
bodily harm, even death, to force compliance. 
Since modern society generally does not favor 
the use of physical power, then a milder form 
of power is used in its stead. For instance, 
rather than mobilizing troops to suppress every 
conflict, modern governments use negotiation 
and political processes to achieve mutually 
acceptable outcomes. Therefore, negotiation 
is a milder power channel within itself, and 
the context where milder and harsher (such 
as, using threats) power is employed (Russell, 
1938 dalam Overbeck & Kim, 2013).
One of the criticism against the power 
approach is that it negates the other abilities that 
negotiators possess, such as communication 
skills (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008). This criticism 
is neither entirely right nor wrong. On the one 
hand, it does seemingly neglect other abilities 
that negotiators have. Yet, studies employing 
the structural approach have provided rebuttals 
of such criticism. One of the examples is a study 
conducted by Frank R. Pfetsch and Alice Landau 
(2000). In their study it is argued that the weak 
party under asymmetric negotiation conditions 
can still gain benefits by using certain strategies 
(Pfetsch & Landau, 2000). Hence, this study also 
elaborates on how certain strategies are used 
by the parties involved to fulfill their interests.
The basic concept of negotiation is 
strategy and tactic (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008). 
A strategy is a plan or method specifically 
utilized to achieve an objective, while a tactic 
is the skill of employing various existing tools 
or means to achieve said objective (Alfredson 
& Cungu, 2008). Numerous experts are in 
agreement that there are two basic concepts of 
negotiation, namely: distributive negotiation 
and integrative negotiation. The two differs 
in the desired outcome, which is the desire to 
end up in a win-lose situation (distributive) or 
the desire to create a win-win situation for all 
(integrative). If we compare them with a cake, 
integrative negotiation entails making the cake 
bigger so that each party can obtain the same 
big piece of the cake. Whereas distributive 
negotiation entails distributing the existing 
cake and surely each party wants the biggest 
piece of the cake.
How can those desires be achieved? 
Certain tactics are developed. Certain tactics 
follow the strategy applied (Weingart & 
Olekalns, 2004)”title”:”Communication Process 




{“formattedCitation”:”(Weingart & Olekalns, 
2004. Since competitive strategy leads to a win-
lose outcome, many (particularly those in favor 
of the integrative school) consider such strategy 
as destructive (Alfredson & Cungu, 2008). In 
this case, Raymond Saner (2004) has identified 
several tactics or attributes of distributive 
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negotiation tactics, such as: coercive: use 
of force or threats; opening strong: start 
negotiations by campaigning positions; and 
subtly such as by prolonging the negotiation 
process or providing minimum concessions.
After employing these strategies and 
tactics, there are consequential behaviors or 
actions brought about by the implementation 
of those strategies and tactics. This is the 
negotiation agreement or outcome. Negotiation 
is a goal oriented activity and every negotiation 
ultimately produces an agreement, either 
satisfying or not (Fells, 2009, p. 4). According 
to Ray Fells (2009, p. 36), the core of integrative 
negotiation is that both sides gain something and 
are happy with their agreement. Satisfied with 
the outcome, they would be more committed 
to implement the outcome unreservedly and 
more positive about the relationship they 
have with the other party. This will help 
facilitate future negotiations among them. 
This is different from distributive negotiation 
wherein one or both parties do not gain 
anything from the negotiation, as a result they 
would be uncommitted to the agreement and 
disliked by the other party. This shows that 
consequences of choosing certain strategy lie 
in the implementation of the agreement.
Methods
The empirical case examined in this study 
is the implementation of the land redistribution 
program in Cipari District, Cilacap Regency. 
The land redistribution was fully implemented 
by mid 2010 with the distribution of land that 
PT Rumpun Sari Antan (RSA) formerly had 
the Right of Exploitation (HGU) over to 5,141 
heads of household from five villages (Caruy, 
Mekarsari, Sidasari, Kutasari, and Karangreja) 
in the district. The program implementer at 
the regency level was known as the (Spatial) 
Arrangement Team and the Technical (Spatial) 
Arrangement Team for the Ex-HGU Land of PT 
RSA; at the district level they were known as the 
Monitoring and Supervising Team for Taking 
Inventory and Data of Cultivators on the Ex-
HGU Land of PT RSA; and at the village level 
it was known as the Team for Taking Inventory 
and Data of Cultivators on the Ex-HGU Land 
of PT RSA. The two teams of the regency and 
the district were only tasked to monitor and 
provide consultations for the village team.
The village team, which directly dealt 
with the target group, is what we consider as 
SLBs and they are the respondents in this study. 
The number of team members in each village 
varied. The initial standard for the number of 
respondents is based on the report made by the 
Cipari District Head to the Cilacap Regent. It 
was reported that there were 60 members in the 
district and village teams. The total member of 
the village team was 53 people. Hence, there 
were 53 respondents in this study. They were 
the members of the village team who were 
examined in this study based on face-to-face 
meetings with the clients, and the people who 
did indeed directly meet the clients.
Information were obtained through 
interviews and in-depth interviews. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with people from the 
team who are considered more knowledgeable 
than their colleagues. They are considered 
as key informants. Meanwhile, interviews 
were conducted with other respondents to 
confirm the information conveyed by the key 
informants. By paying close attention to the 
depth of information conveyed, the amount 
of key informants in this study was then 
determined, i.e. 4 individuals. The technique 
employed was by asking the key question 
‘why was the amount at 5,141?’ If the response 
given was a description that is lengthy and 
informative, then that respondent’s information 
would be considered as worth using. By using 
this technique, as many as 5 key informants 
were obtained, in which two of them were SLBs 
and three were clients. Then, as a triangulation 
measure, the information acquired from the 
key informants were confirmed to several 
other respondents, in which at least 17 of them 
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were consulted. Using the same key question, 
about 8 people answered in line with the 
information obtained from the key informants. 
The interview process was conducted in three 
stages. Every stage of the interview was done 
with a long time span between them. The 
first stage was called the introduction stage. 
The second and third stage was called the 
deepening stage or it can also be considered 
as the effort to confirm the existing responses.
Subsequently, the gathered information 
was managed as is commonly done by 
qualitative study, up to the point where the 
findings are then presented as in the following 
passages. 
Results 
The low level bureaucrats of Agrarian 
Reform policy are considered as bureaucrats 
that negotiated not because they chose to 
negotiate but because they were in a situation 
of disagreement with other actors in the policy 
implementation process. According to the 
definition of negotiation provided by Ray Fells 
(2009, p. 4), negotiation takes place when two 
parties with differences try to resolve their 
differences by exchanging offers or exploring 
alternatives to ultimately reach an agreement, 
and based on this, the negotiations the SLBs of 
RA conducted with the other party were the 
SLBs’ efforts to obtain the agreement of other 
actors regarding the decision they have made 
and vice versa. From the Cipari RA case, the 
SLBs’ focus of negotiation was to carry out the 
decision that has been made. Whereas the focus 
of the other party is to fulfill their desire. The 
two differing focuses had lead to a deadlock. 
However, concurrently the SLBs also applied 
various tactics in the strategy they made. On 
the other hand, there were internal factors in 
the opposition that contributed in paving the 
way for negotiations, in which ultimately one 
of the party left the negotiation.
Basically, this section describes the efforts 
of RA SLBs to get their clients and organizations 
to agree with the decisions they made. The 
decisions made by the Cipari RA SLBs in order 
to implement land redistribution at the time 
were: (1) the clients must pay compensation 
fee; (2) negotiate the compensation amount 
with the company; (3) the clients are the 
cultivators and the poor; (4) the size of land is 
distributed equally; (5) accommodate residents 
from outside the district; (6) provide bailout for 
compensation cost; and (7) provide one plot of 
land to the head of the committee. Two (1 & 
3) of the decisions were rejected by the clients 
and their organization. The rejection was based 
on various reasons, such as: since the start of 
their struggle/advocacy not a word of ‘paying 
compensation fee’ was mentioned; if payment 
were made, it would be akin to creating a 
‘market for land’; and since the beginning, since 
a long time ago, the farmers who advocated 
for the right to own land were cultivators who 
had either passed or still lived in or outside of 
Cipari. 
The rejection dragged on for about two 
years, from 2008 when negotiation efforts 
carried out by the association of village heads 
and the plantation company were found out 
by the clients and their organization until 2010 
when the payment for the compensation fee 
was executed. It is this two-year period which is 
regarded as the process of negotiations between 
Cipari RA SLBs and the clients along with their 
organization. 
a. Negotiation Preparation
The negotiations carried out by Cipari 
RA SLBs were not formal negotiations where 
both parties sit together, exchanging offers 
finding an alternative, and then arriving at 
an agreement. The negotiations conducted by 
Cipari RA SLBs were not different to real life 
actual negotiations, like: a child asking for a 
particular toy and whining to their parents 
then eventually the parents would buy it for 
them. The negotiations that Cipari RA SLBs 
carried out were things that others would do 
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when they are put in the same position. Thus, 
the preparation stage in the Cipari RA SLBs 
negotiations was the stage in which various 
information or preferences of the respective 
parties were able to be conveyed.
Given that, commonly, the preparation 
process is indicated by the unravelling 
of positions into interests, the process of 
negotiation preparation that Cipari RA SLBs 
undertook can be considered as a bad one. Both 
parties were able to state another alternative 
when asked what if their desire was not 
accommodated by the SLBs or was still rejected 
by the clients. As one of the key informants 
mentioned: “what else can you do...the rule is 
already set”; “it’s very reasonable for an owner to 
ask for compensation for something handed over 
to another person”. One of the key informants 
from the client side also said the same: “there 
shouldn’t be any compensation given for that land 
because if there were then a market for land would 
ensue”.
In terms of information exchange, the 
preparation process can be considered as bad. 
Exchange of information occurred unilaterally. 
As admitted by the key informant from the SLBs, 
he/she has known about the wish of the clients 
and client’s organization since a long time 
ago. The key informant said that he knew the 
activities of the farmer organization members 
by heart, how they carry out their protests, and 
how they engage in communication during 
their protests or meetings. On the contrary, the 
clients did not clearly know the interests of the 
SLBs. “I was rather surprised when I heard that the 
village head association has conducted meetings 
with the plantation company”.
The processes or struggle of the farmer’s 
movement through protests and then followed 
by forming farmer organizations in every 
village (Santoso, 2016) can also be considered 
as an effort to build up power. At the very least, 
the power structure the clients possess had 
already been established when the negotiation 
process took place. The statement that validates 
this is as follows: “we are also afraid to take a step 
because there is the possibility that it would suddenly 
be reported in the newspaper”. This statement 
came up when the discussion continued to the 
topic that those meetings with the company 
were conducted without the facilitation of 
other parties. The meetings took place purely 
through the use of personal resources.
b. Use of Power
The power that each party wields in 
a negotiation process can be more easily 
explained from one of the party’s origin of 
power. According to Roger Fisher (1983), the 
power wielded by the negotiating parties is a 
totality of power sources that originate from: 
skills and knowledge, good relationship, good 
alternatives, elegant solutions, legitimacy, 
and commitment. Both parties involved in 
the Cipari RA negotiations did not have 
good power. Each party had an incomplete 
source of power. The SLBs of RA had power 
from legitimacy, but they did not have power 
originating from good alternative. This was also 
the case with the clients. The clients had power 
originating from good relationship with other 
parties but they had no good alternative as well 
(summarized in table 2). The following table 
provides a detailed account on the power that 
each party had in the Cipari RA negotiation.
Table 2.





Skills and knowledge Yes Yes
Good relationship Yes No
Good alternatives No No




  Another issue relating to power is how 
the parties utilize or benefit from their power. 
The SLBs’ power, which came from their self 
151
Deden Dani Saleh, Wahyudi Kumorotomo, Agustinus Subarsono, Bambang Hudayana, Second Level Coping 
Mechanism: A Study on Problem Solving Measures Taken by Street-Level Bureaucrats Concerning Agrarian 
Policy in Cipari, Cilacap
legitimacy as village head, allows themselves to 
determine the negotiation objective they want 
to achieve. The following box is an excerpt from 
an interview with an informant. In the box, it 
is interesting to note that there was the issue 
of an SLB’s ‘conviction in a particular means of 
resolution’. This was a belief held by one of the 
RA SLBs, and due to the SLB’s administrative 
position as village head, the issue was raised 
and became an issue of the SLB organization 
as a whole.
Box 1.
Resident Must Pay Compensation
Source: interview with former village head of 
Karangreja, December 2017 and April 
2018.
Another use of power demonstrated 
by the SLBs was the power to form the RA 
implementation executing organization. RA 
SLBs legitimacy as village heads allowed them 
to select people who would help in carrying 
out activities. The committee, which was 
required by the regulation, seemed to function 
as an institution that facilitated the use of their 
power. In one of the RA SLB’s interview, it was 
admitted that he/she purposely included clients 
who were members of the farmer organizations 
and felt helped by such process, as revealed by 
one of the informants: “they are indeed skillful and 
intelligent when they talk, but once we embraced 
them…they became silent”. 
Whereas on the side of the clients, the 
use of their ‘power’, which originated from 
their relationship with other parties, along 
with their existing knowledge was not explored 
properly by the owner. Their power, which 
originated from knowledge and skills, was only 
used when they showed their disagreement 
against the decisions of the RA SLBs during 
meetings, as revealed by an informant: “when 
they started talking...all kinds of regulations 
were mentioned” and even this had become a 
boomerang when they used speech that was 
considered inappropriate when they delivered 
their arguments. This was also stated by an 
informant: “how are we to respect them if their way 
of speaking is indecent…words like helper or slave 
of the society was often mentioned”.
Another ‘power’ that the clients had 
not explored or to be precise had not been 
aware of was the power they had from their 
good relations with other parties (in this case 
NGOs or even the highest official of BPN at 
the time). As mentioned earlier, one of the 
SLBs’ reluctance to immediately execute their 
decisions was their fear of the clients making 
the RA SLBs’ decision-making method go viral 
via mass media. In this context, actually, the 
SLBs only considered that the clients have the 
capacity to take numerous measures that can 
put the RA SLBs at a disadvantage. While in 
fact, that was the real ‘power’ that the RA SLBs 
were most fearful of and the implementation of 
their decisions had only been applicable after 
more or less two years of negotiation process.
c. Strategy and Tactics
Based on the previous description, it is 
explained that the power each party had in the 
Cipari RA negotiation was essentially equal, 
at least within the two-year period it was. On 
the one hand, one side was ultimately able to 
implement various decisions while the other 
party, the clients, had the capacity to reject 
them, and these two activities had led to a 
‘deadlock’ in the negotiation for two years. 
Box
Residents Must Pay Compensation 
...actually no one believed that the PT. RSA HGU 
conflict or program will finish. Conflict resolution 
efforts have been carried out for a long time. Other 
village heads have tried to resolve this conflict to no 
avail. The former village heads reminded me to try 
and resolve this problem. That’s why since I became a 
village head candidate I promised to resolve this issue 
and help the community’s struggle concerning the 
HGU conflict. The only way that I believe can resolve 
this conflict is that there must be compensation fee 
given to PT. RSA. It’s very reasonable if the former land 
owner asks for compensation fee and it is already in 
line with the existing regulation and the BPN (National 
Land Agency) also said so.
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However, during the two years, both sides did 
not remain silent. Particularly the SLBs, they 
were engaged in making strategies as indicated 
through several of their more obvious tactics. 
One of the tactics employed by RA 
SLBs was the organization tactic. This study 
considers the tactic of enrolling clients to become 
organization member as an organization tactic. 
This tactic was feasible because, firstly, the rule 
or regulation did indeed stipulate the formation 
of an implementing organization for the land 
redistribution program, and secondly, the 
formation of the implementing organization 
turned into a facility utilized by RA SLBs to 
weaken the clients’ solidarity. Aside from being 
‘embraced to silence’ as mentioned earlier, the 
organizational function of the clients who were 
made into committee members had thwarted the 
clients’ dissents. The clients’ discontent against 
SLBs’ decisions, which was realized by slowing 
down activities, was unraveled when there was 
a client who became an organization member. 
The compliance of organization members had 
emerged within the clients’ self through their 
‘desire to promptly finish their job’. This is 
revealed from the response given by one of the 
respondents who stated that their task must 
immediately be completed so that the job is 
quickly over with. The organization tactic was 
also employed for organizations above the SLBs. 
This was also influential to the condition of the 
clients’ solidarity. The clients, particularly the 
clients’ organization was made into a member 
of the district level committee. The principle 
‘embrace to moderate‘ was also used in forming 
the district level implementing organization.
Another tactic employed by the SLBs was 
the tactic of using the power of others. In this case, 
SLBs engaged in a relationship with the National 
Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional – BPN) 
to immediately conduct sketch measurements 
of the area since the applicant data was already 
complete. This tactic destroyed the clients, 
particularly the leader of the farmer organization 
SeTam. The statement of the leader of SeTam 
when talking about ‘BPN came and measured 
land areas’: “yes, well, if that’s what Mr. Joyo 
wants”. Then the informant also mentioned 
what Joyo Winoto said to him “that’s enough 
mbah (common honorific for elderly; grandfather/
grandmother), now the people already have 
their right of ownership…later, about the (land) 
certificate, we will try to get it without having to 
pay”. This study interprets the situation above as 
follows: the clients or clients’ organization had 
indeed become extremely powerless since the 
only power the clients had at the time had turned 
and supported the SLBs.
Another tactic that should be mentioned 
is a tactic employed by the clients. As the clients’ 
solidarity was being gradually worn down, the 
clients also employed their own tactics, which is 
a kind of salami tactic, by prolonging the process. 
What the clients had done was prolonging the time 
to finish the job they have been instructed with. 
This occurred while they were taking inventory 
and data at Mekarsari village. According to one 
of the informants, this village has always been the 
basis for farmer organization in Cipari, he stated: 
“at the time, the work in that village had always been 
the last one to finish compared to the other villages”. 
Although this remained unconfirmed, it shows 
that there were certain measures carried out by 
the clients that succeeded in affecting the duration 
of the program’s implementation. 
d. Negotiation Outcome
The negotiation outcome is an agreement 
that may or may not satisfy one of the party. 
It is an undeniable fact, however, that land 
distribution was done and given to 5,141 
residents from five villages in Cipari District. 
This amount is indicative of how SLBs’ interest 
was fully implemented. This happened because 
the clients pulled out of the negotiation process. 
Evidence indicating that the clients have pulled 
out of the negotiation process is the statement: 
“yes, well…if that’s what they want” with an 
additional statement: “if anything happens don’t 
blame me”. This statement was repeatedly heard 
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from one of the farmer organization’s leaders. 
There was a moment following a discussion 
and conversations relating to the execution of 
land distribution where the leader of the farmer 
organization said something while looking afar 
with teary eyes: “if I keep thinking about it, I also 
regret why it could end up like that”. I think that 
this is an indication that the land redistribution 
in Cipari, Cilacap was a mistake.
Aside from the tactics employed by the 
SLBs and the clients, the withdrawal of the 
clients from the negotiation was influenced by 
several factors, namely: personal values, social 
cohesion values, and group stamina. Personal 
values were shown through the statement of 
one of the informants that he/she has argued 
with a lot of people for a long time and he/she 
no longer intends to argue with his childhood 
friend any longer. The statement he/she made: 
“do I also have to be at odds with my own friends 
now”. Social cohesion values were shown 
through the statement that he/she carries along 
the interest of many people, their interest relied 
on him/her, meanwhile, that person’s neighbor 
had gained the same thing that they have been 
struggling for all this time. The leader of the 
farmer organization merely contemplated, 
could it be that they too become suspicious 
of each other. The statement he/she made: 
“what do we do Mbah”. Lastly, in relation to 
organization stamina there was a statement that 
the struggle of farmer cultivators has continued 
since a long time ago and it will not achieve any 
outcome if it is not completed: “I am tired...I have 
fought for a long time...perhaps now it should be 
ended”. Hence, based on those statements, the 
negotiation agreement of Cipari RA SLBs with 
the clients ended satisfactorily for the SLBs and 
discontentedly for the clients, particularly the 
leader of SeTam farmer organization.
Discussion
Basically, the negotiation conducted by 
SLBs with the clients or the clients’ organization 
was to negotiate their position. According to 
William Ury (2007) this kind of negotiation is 
difficult, even impossible. The SLBs held the 
position that their decision be implemented 
and followed, while the clients held the position 
that their desire be accommodated by the SLBs. 
However, due to the power that each of the 
party involved had, the negotiation was able 
to keep going.
The negotiation did indeed continue, 
but it was not one that ran on the basis 
of good preparation. Poor negotiation 
preparation rendered the interests of each 
party unrecognized by the parties. The lack 
of narrative concerning the interests of the 
negotiating parties indicates how bad the 
negotiation preparation was done. This 
condition substantiates the proposition made 
by Ursula Ott et al. (2016) that good preparation 
will guarantee good exchange of information 
and it will pave the way for the emergence of 
creativity and ultimately produce satisfying 
outcome. The outcome of this negotiation failed 
to satisfy one of the parties. As mentioned by 
Ott et al. (2016) good preparation will also 
resolve deadlocks and eventually achieve 
satisfying negotiation outcome. In the context 
of Cipari RA negotiation, the proposition Ott 
et al. made has been revalidated because the 
preparation that was based solely on power 
had ultimately ended up in a deadlock.
As a coping mechanism, negotiation in 
the public policy process is an unavoidable 
activity, since in the policy process itself 
multiple actors are involved. At the same time, 
the actors bring their own interest as well as has 
various social, economic, cultural, and other 
backgrounds. Thus, all of the diverse interests 
need to be articulated, as a form of the actor’s 
actions in the policy process. In the negotiation 
process, of course there will be two possibilities 
faced by the parties (actors), as the winner  or 
as the losers. In this context, the parties who 
become the winner in the negotiation process 
are highly considered to have control over on 
more resources. The winner parties manage 
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all the resources productively to well support 
the negotiation process. On the other hand, 
the parties who loose during the negoatiation 
process are assumed to have fewer resources 
and therefore they cannot productively 
support. Consequently, the interests of the 
parties (actors) who win the negotiation 
process then applied as the basis for decision-
making as a result of the negotiation process.
In the perspective of public policy, there 
is a polarization of the experts opinions for the 
negotiation process in a public policy. Some 
experts argue that negotiation is inevitable 
activities in the public policy process, and 
it is basically positive. Conversely, others 
expressed that the negotiation activities 
have a negative nature due to the various 
interests of each actor involved. This latter 
arguments  provide a framework of thought 
that negotiation activities in a public policy 
should be avoided as much as possible. This 
study does not take the position in either one of 
the opinion of the expert about the negotiation 
mentioned above. The study has more focus 
on how to construct the reality of negotiations 
in public policy process by the street-level 
bureaucrats. The results of this research show 
that the negotiation process has succeeded in 
completing the stages of the asset legalization 
policy as part of the Agrarian Reform policy in 
Indonesia. However, the negotiation activities 
have been inadequately implemented, since 
there are actors who dominates i.e. the state 
actors, and who are in an subordinated position 
in the negotiation processi i.e. non-state actors 
such as farmers affiliated in the community 
movement. The overall descriptions on the 
above mentioned negotiation process develop 
a new and even wider persepctive on the 
knowledge of negotiation behaviors as well as 
its various consequences.
Conclusion
This study, ultimately, finds that 
distributive negotiation, or in other words, 
second level coping mechanism is influenced 
by the relative power among the parties 
involved. The effect of this power had led the 
negotiation process to a momentary deadlock. 
By using ‘power’ some of the parties chose a 
distributive negotiation strategy to break the 
deadlock, and it was indeed broken by means 
of one of the parties withdrawing from the 
negotiation process. 
This study concluded that negotiation is 
one form of the problem solving mechanism 
implementing by the street level beaurecrats 
(SLBs). The description of the mentioned coping 
mechanism is a slightly different from the 
mechanisms previously introduced. The problem 
solving mechanism by the SLBs on the agrarian 
reform in Cipari Cilacap is a mechanism for 
a problem solving in the next stage after the 
SLBs decided a solution of the problems in the 
implementation. This shows that SLBs discretion 
is basically not something inherent but must be 
fought so that it can be realized.
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